


Risk assessment during an emergency

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Outline


- Background and introduction
 - When do we need a sound risk assessment based on monitoring and modelling in a nuclear emergency to assure proper decision making and a balanced long-term health care for the population?
- Decision-making in an emergency
 - Phases
 - Decision support system
 - Protective measures and needs
- Risk estimation bases on early assessments (CONFIDENCE project)
- Summary and conclusions

Phases of an event (adapted from NERIS SRA)


PREPAREDNESS	PRE-RELEASE PHASE / THREAT PHASE	EMERGENCY RESPONSE			LONG TERM PHASE
	Urgent Response Phase		Early Response Phase	Transition Phase	
Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Planning Stakeholder participation Education and training, Including Exercises R&D	Implementation of Early countermeasures	Precautionary and urgent protective actions	Early protective actions and other response actions	Lifting of Early countermeasures Implementation of transition phase countermeasures Preparing long term remediation	Resumption of normal living conditions
Normal Exposure Situation Planned Exposure Situation	Emergency Exposure Situation				Existing, planned Exposure Situation Normal Exposure Situation
	Hours - days		Days - weeks	Weeks - years	




Exposure of people, for airborne accidental releases from nuclear power plants



Exposure with time



Decision-making



Possible tasks of a decision support system for off-site nuclear emergency management


- Provide **consistent and comprehensive information** at local, regional and national levels, for all accident phases
 - **During real event** (housing and displaying of relevant information about the **release**, the weather, the **contamination**; forecast of **health**, agricultural and economic **impacts** with and without the application of **countermeasure**)
 - **When preparing** for a possible future event (creating scenarios and background material for planning, exercises and training)
- **Assist decision makers** in evaluating different measures against a range of quantitative and qualitative criteria
- **Promote a common emergency management frame** aiming to move away from national solutions

Decisions to be taken

- Early phase measures
 - **Evacuation**: best before the plume reaches the location
 - **Distribution of iodine tablets**: best before the plume reaches the location
 - **Sheltering**: during plume passage
- Early phase measures are taken just considering a postulated release/source term and model simulations – typically no **monitoring** information is available

How to use monitoring information

- As mentioned before, often decisions are taken based on **prognostic information**
- As soon as **measurements** become available, decisions taken might be **adjusted**
- So the area of sheltering might be checked via the Operational Intervention Limit (**OIL**) that fit to that protective measure
- As result, the proposed area might be adapted – or not



The CONFIDENCE Project

- The general objective was to **understand and if possible reduce uncertainties in decision making** during a nuclear emergency
- WP2, coordinated by Clemens Woda, aimed at: **Improving awareness of the radiological situation** by optimizing monitoring data, dose assessment, individual dose measurements and calculating health risk estimates
- I will present results of that work performed by the following researchers

HelmholtzZentrum münchen
German Research Center for Environmental Health

A. Mafodda, C. Kaiser, A. Ulanowski

Ciemat
Centro de Investigaciones
Energéticas, Medioambientales
y Tecnológicas

I. Sierra Bercedo
J.F. Navarro

IRSN
INSTITUT
DE RADIOPROTECTION
ET DE SÛRETÉ NUCLÉAIRE

C. Challeton-de Vathaire,
D. Estelle,
D. Franck

STUK

J. Lahtinen
T. Karhunen



Bundesamt für Strahlenschutz

U. Stöhlker
U. Kulka
A. Giussani

 Public Health
England

J. Eakins,
J. Marsh,
D. Gregoratto

RPI
Ukraine

V. Berkovskyy
Gennadii Ratia

KIT
Karlsruher Institut für Technologie

B. Breustedt

 Statens strålevern
Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority


A. Nalbandyan
A. Jaworska

 Universität
Zürich

L. Walsh

The various monitoring tasks

Task interaction




How to obtain the necessary measurements


- Stationary stations (e.g. EURDEP, gamma dose rate stations around NPPs)
- Mobile measurements with e.g. cars, helicopters or drones
- External dose-rate measurements based on smartphone CMOS sensor
- Combine measurements with occupancy information
 - Knowing the time a person stays at one location, it might be possible to get an individual dose assessment for that person

Tool that exists at BfS

Measurement data



Dose rates and doses
estimated from
measurements



Dose calculation for an
individual movement profile




Risk estimation

- In the long term recovery phase, the need for long term health care actions is obvious
- In particular, risk estimation for population groups that were either evacuated, sheltered or administered iodine tablets might be necessary as soon as possible
 - Examination of possible health effects
 - Screening activities, e.g. thyroid examination
- A sound dose estimation is important as basis for the risk estimation
- Fukushima provided an example on the processes and the time needed for the “final” risk estimation

Fukushima experience

Fukushima: 11 March 2011



Publication describing the CONFIDENCE approach

Radiation and Environmental Biophysics
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s00411-019-00809-x>

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Risk bases can complement dose bases for implementing and optimising a radiological protection strategy in urgent and transition emergency phases

Linda Walsh¹  · Alexander Ulanowski^{2,3} · Jan Christian Kaiser² · Clemens Woda² · Wolfgang Raskob⁴

All solid cancer
 100mSv effective dose
 LAR: Lifetime
 Attributable risk




Fig. 1 Male and female all solid cancer baseline (dark grey) and radiation (light grey with error bars) risks in cases per 10,000 persons calculated from LBR and the LAR for 100 mSv effective dose. Error bars are for 95% confidence intervals

Approach


- The **idea**: Assessment of **Lifetime risks** (Lifetime Baseline Risk, Lifetime Attributable Risks, Lifetime Fractional Risks) based on **one** exposure
- **Needs**: Calculation of lifetime risks requires input from **published risk to dose response models** (for various ages at exposure, attained ages and sex) and population data
- **Examples**:
 - All solid cancers (ICD10:C00-C80) from Japanese A-bomb LSS cohort:1958-2009 (Grant et al 2017)
 - Organ dose type required: Colon
 - All leukemia (ICD10:C91-C95), excl. CLL (C91.1, C91.4) and ATL (C91.5) from LSS cohort:1958-2001 (Hsu et al 2013)
 - Organ dose type required: Red Bone Marrow

Data considered

- German cancer register (RKI) – incidence and mortality rates for the selected cancer outcomes
- Scandinavian (Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Norway) cancer statistics (NORDCAN, IARC) – incidence and mortality rates for the selected cancer outcomes
- Switzerland (WHO & *www.krebs.bfs.admin.ch*)
- General survival data from life tables for Germany (Destatis.de) and other European countries (*ec.europa.eu/Eurostat*, *http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/estat-navtree-portlet-prod/BulkDownloadListing?file=data/demo_mlifetable.tsv.gz*, accessed on 27.11.2017)

How to apply

- The average **population size & structure** in region of interest is needed and used to calculate the absolute number of expected cases
- Population is subdivided into **three age groups** (female as conservative assumption)
 - Children 5 – 10 years
 - Adults 20 – 40 years
 - Seniors > 65 years
- Doses are normalised to cases per 100 mSv (mGy) as for example figure on the right side
- **Uncertainties** are also provided




Issues to be solved

- How to get the necessary dose values for the affected population?
- How to consider **internal doses** obtained during plume passage – so far the method/tool is limited to external exposure?
- Number of affected population for our example case with a large source term – based on JRODOS simulations
 - About 9 Mio people living in the area considered
 - **Sheltering**: close to **500000** people were sheltered
 - **Evacuation**: about **47000** people were evacuated based on 100 mSv over 7 days
 - **Iodine tablets** were needed for about **330000 children** and **233000 adults**

Data assimilation

- **Combine** model results with monitoring information
- The example from the CONFIDENCE exercise shows the plume in terms of probability maps and the available monitoring stations
- Having **ensemble** information from the models and **uncertainty** from both model and monitoring networks allows using ensemble assimilation approaches
- Result is an areal dose information



Summary and Perspectives

- **Decision-making** in an emergency, in particular in the early and intermediate phases has to deal with **large uncertainties**
- First decisions are based on **simulation models**
- **Adaptation** of measures will be based on **monitoring** information
- A proper **risk assessment** can be the basis for decisions on long term health care actions
- Within the **CONFIDENCE** project, a methodology has been developed **demonstrating** such an assessment early in the emergency
- The **combination** of **measurements**, **simulation** results and **occupancy** information might be a promising method to obtain the **necessary dose estimation** to allow pre-planning of necessary actions in time

Thank you for your attention!

<https://resy5.iket.kit.edu>

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